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1. Introduction 
In this paper we study the issue of institutional enforcement of regulations by focusing on 
labor-market policies and their potential link to economic performance. We test the different 
impacts of enforceable and non-enforceable labor regulations by proxying non-enforceable 
labor rigidity measures using data on conventions from the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). It has been argued that non-enforceable conventions—that is, those that exist on paper 
and are simply de jure regulations—appear to be more distortionary and tend to be the least 
enforced in practice (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997). According to Freeman (1993), 
these conventions reflect the ideal regulatory framework from an institutionalist perspective 
and cover a variety of labor market issues, from child labor to placement agencies. Whereas in 
theory, a country’s ratification of ILO conventions gives the country legal status and thus 
supersedes domestic regulations relating to those issues, in practice the degree of labor-market 
rigidity depends on how the conventions are enforced. It is the outcome of the regulations that 
matters, rather than their number. Different observers emphasize different outcomes: minimum 
wages, mandated benefits (such as old-age pension, health insurance, or maternity leave), 
mandated job security and high firing costs, large and powerful trade unions, and the 
government’s share of the labor force. Note that distortions of this latter sort do not necessarily 
stem from a “thick” labor code, which re-emphasizes the distinction between non-enforceable 
and enforceable measures. 
There are two broad views regarding the role of labor-market regulation in economic 
performance. The distortionists argue that government regulations in labor markets—such as 
minimum wages, social security contributions, job security, and collective bargaining—create 
distortions (World Bank, 1990). In this view, labor-market regulations are obstacles to growth 
for at least three reasons: they prevent wages from equaling their marginal product in 
equilibrium, leading to a misallocation of resources; they hinder the adjustment of the labor 
market to shocks, and finally, labor regulations that redistribute economic rents from capital to 
labor reduce the profitability of investment and lead to lower growth rates.  
The institutionalists claim that market failures generate divergences from the ideal 
world and emphasize the benefits of government interventions in the labor markets (ILO, 
1991). Labor regulations fulfill redistributive roles for low-wage workers or constitute   5
insurance against adverse market outcomes (Standing and Tokman, 1991). Labor standards 
force employers to focus on enhancing their labor force through either training or technical 
innovation (Freeman, 1993). Finally, standards on mandated benefits may help solve moral 
hazard or selectivity issues that prevent firms from offering socially desirable benefits or 
contracts (Summers, 1988).
2   
We use Rama and Artecona (2002), which contains panel data on labor regulations on 
paper and in practice for several countries, and focus on the period 1970-2000. The data are 
organized in five-year period averages. Regulation on paper, or non-enforceable regulation, is 
approximated by the number of International Labor Organization standards ratified by the 
national labor laws.
3 Regulation in practice, or enforceable regulation, is proxied by 
information on categories such as minimum wages, conditions of work and benefits, trade 
unions and collective bargaining, and public-sector employment.  
We report the panel data regression results using three different types of estimators: 
least-squares-based estimators, including pooled ordinary least squares least squares with time 
effects, and least squares with country dummies (fixed-effects estimator); IV estimator using 
pooled IV and IV with time and country effects; and the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimators for dynamic panel data models developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Here, we appropriately control for 
the presence of unobserved country effects in a dynamic panel data model, and we account for 
endogenous regressors with both external and internal instruments. 
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology applied, Section 3 discusses the findings, and Section 4 concludes. 
                                                           
2 Forteza and Rama (2006) study the role of labor-market regulations in the success of economic reforms. They 
find that wage adjustment and labor reallocation in outward-oriented economies will be faster if labor markets are 
flexible. Potential losers from economic reforms, such as workers in the public sector or unionized labor, usually 
try to hinder the adjustment process (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Besley and 
Burguess (2004) assess the role of labor-market regulations in explaining the performance of the Indian 
manufacturing industry between 1958 and 1992, and find that regulations designed to protect workers actually 
reduce growth and increase poverty. 
3 Among the conventions ratified and included in this index, we have universal legislation on issues such as child 
labor, compulsory labor, equal remuneration for male and female workers, equal opportunity, the right of 
collective bargaining, and organization in unions, among others.   6
2. Empirical Approach 
 
Our regression framework is specified by the following system: 
it it k it k t it
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According to the first equation, the equilibrium growth rate of the economy in country i 
during the [t,t-k] period, dy*it,t-k, is a function of the log of per capita output in the initial period 
t-k, yit-k; a set of the growth determinants for country i at time t described by the matrix Xit; and 
unobserved country- and period-specific effects, μi and ηt, respectively.  
Our second equation states that any deviation in long-term equilibrium growth may be 
explained by a set of variables that proxy for the departures from competition in the labor 
markets, Lit. This matrix, L, is our variable of interest; it may comprise different indicators that 




it l 1 } { =  all the K 
indicators of labor market rigidities comprised in the matrix, Lit. We do not assume that labor-
market policies and institutions are time-invariant, but rather expect that labor institutions may 
change over longer horizons. If any of the l it
k variables equal 0, labor markets are perfectly 
competitive. In contrast, larger values for any of these variables indicate greater deviation from 
perfect competition in the labor market. Negative values for the γk coefficients in the Γ matrix 
imply that the reduction of labor rigidities—that is, distortions that cause labor markets to 
depart from competitive equilibrium—may improve the growth rate in the long term.  
Testing equation (1) may raise additional empirical problems. Some of the lit
k variables 
are highly correlated with each other, thus leading to problems of multicolinearity.
4  This 
problem of colinearity impedes identification of the parameters of the variance-covariance 
matrix. We address the issue among labor-market regulation indicators by aggregating the 
variables in the Lit matrix, using a similar strategy as Forteza and Rama (2006). Before we 
aggregate them in a single index, we need to normalize them so as to express them in 
comparable units. We define our labor-market rigidity indicator above as lit
k, for k=1,…,K. 
Next, we define lmin
k  and lmax
k as the minimum and maximum deviations from perfect 
                                                           
4 For example, the correlation between trade union membership and government employment is approximately 
0.8, whereas mandated benefits and minimum wage have a correlation of 0.5.   7
competition that a country’s labor market can achieve. We can thus specify our normalized 















fluctuates between 0 and 1. We then define our aggregate measure of labor-market rigidities 
as the average of J out of the K relevant labor-market rigidities (where  K J ≤ ). In principle, 
this aggregate index also ranges from 0 to 1, but unless all of the labor-market rigidities are 
perfectly correlated with each other, the actual range of variation across countries should be 
significantly narrower for the aggregate measures than for any of the individual indicators. We 
use our aggregate index lit
A, to test the effects of the overall labor-market rigidity on growth. 
We reformulate (1) as: 
it
A
A k t it k t it it l dy dy ξ γ + + = − − , , *                            (2) 
The sign and order of γA can be used to check the nature and magnitude of the impact of 
labor-market rigidities on growth. However, different labor-market rigidities may have 
different signs that can cancel each other out to some extent. Even if the estimate of the 
parameter γA turned out to be significant, its mere sign might not help identify the specific 
policies and institutions that need to be reformulated. We still need more information on the 
sign and order of magnitude of the γj parameters. We are tempted to use equation (2) to test for 
the effects of particular labor-market rigidities. If lit




 in equation (2), the 
coefficient multiplying it captures not only the effects of the labor-market regulation, k, but also 
(partly) those of all of the other missing rigidities. Since they are likely to be correlated with 
each other, the value obtained for γk might be reflecting the effects of these other rigidities. For 
example, let us assume that unionized labor does not affect growth, but minimum wages do, 
and that minimum wages tend to be higher in countries with larger labor unions. If we include 
minimum wages in equation (2) instead of lit
A, we obtain a significant estimate for this variable 
even though it should be statistically and economically insignificant. This problem can be 
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average of the indicators that are different from k. This variable can be used to control for all 













* , ,                                       (3) 
with γk capturing the effect of labor-market regulation k on long-term growth.  
2.1 Data 
We use Rama and Artecona (2002), which contains panel data on labor regulations on paper 
and in practice for 121 countries and is organized in five-year observations from 1970 to 2000.
5 
The data distinguishes between regulations on paper and regulations in practice. We follow 
Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2006) in defining aggregate indices of the overall extent 
of labor regulations on the economy. Our non-enforceable labor rigidity measure is defined as 
the cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified by a country’s labor code over time. This 
measure reflects not only the ideal regulatory framework from an institutionalist view, but also 
the so-called “thickness” of the labor code (Forteza and Rama, 2006). The index includes 
ratified ILO conventions regarding the minimum age of employment (Convention 138); forced 
or compulsory labor (Convention 29); the abolition of forced labor (Convention 105); equal 
remuneration for male and female workers (Convention 100); discrimination with regard to 
equality of opportunity or conditions of employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, political 
opinion, or social origin (Convention 111); the right of workers and employers to establish 
associations or organizations of their own (Convention 87); and the right to bargain collectively 
(Convention 98). 
The extent of regulation in the labor market depends on the way these regulations and 
norms are implemented and enforced.
6 We use an indicator that captures the degree of 
                                                           
5 The countries included are (i) Industrial: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States; (ii) Latin America: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela; (iii) East and South Asia: China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (iv) Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovak Rep, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia; (v) Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; and (vi) Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
6 Botero et al. (2004) have produced a recent labor regulation data set on, mostly, enforceable measures. The 
usefulness of these data is limited for our purposes as it is only available for a cross-section of countries for the 
2000s.   9
enforcement as opposed to, simply, the number of regulations. Following the methodology 
described above, we construct an aggregate index of regulations in practice using information 
on the following four categories: minimum wages, mandated benefits, trade unions, and public-
sector employment.
7 Following Forteza and Rama (2006), we construct an aggregate index of 
enforceable labor regulations as the simple average of the ratio of minimum wage to income 
per capita, the number of days of maternity leave for a first child born without complications, 
the ratification of ILO Convention 87 that allows workers to establish organizations, and the 
ratio of central government employment to total employment.
8  As described above, we 
normalize all the labor-market regulation indicators in such a way that their values fluctuate 
between 0 and 1. Countries with the highest (lowest) extent of labor regulation have a score of 
1 (0).
9   
The dependent variable is the per-capita growth rate of gross domestic product from the 
Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002).
10 We follow the vast empirical literature on growth 
and include broadly accepted regressors. This is the case with the initial GDP per capita (in 
logs) to account for transitional convergence. Similarly, we include controls that reflect 
structural factors such as the level of secondary schooling (Barro and Lee, 2000), which proxies 
human capital; credit to the private sector as a ratio to GDP to account for financial depth 
(Beck et al., 2001); the ratio of real exports and imports to GDP as a measure of trade openness 
(Loayza et al., 2003); a measure of civil liberties to account for institutions and governance 
(Loayza et al., 2003); basic macro controls to account for economic stability, such as the 
consumer price index inflation rate, the real exchange-rate overvaluation, and terms of trade 
                                                           
7 Heckman and Pagés (2000) constructed data on job separation costs for Latin America and found that these costs 
have a substantial impact on the level of employment in the region. Unfortunately, data on job separation costs are 
available for only a very limited sample of countries 
8 Forteza and Rama (2006) also test another index based on the simple average of the ratio of the minimum wage 
to unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector, social security contributions as a percentage of salaries, total trade 
union membership as a percentage of total labor force, and the share of general government employment in total 
employment. Whereas we also tested this index, we do not report the findings as the results were similar. They are 
available upon request. 
9 In addition, the aggregate index of regulation is computed for countries with at least two of the four dimensions 
involved in the analysis. Unfortunately, there are not enough data to construct an indicator of job separation costs 
covering a large number of countries. Heckman and Pagés (2000) find that job separation costs have a substantial 
impact on the level of employment in Latin America. 
10 In particular, we use the real gross domestic product per capita (chain index prices).    10
(Loayza et al., 2003). All these data come from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2005)
 11 
Table 1 shows the basic summary statistics of both the non-enforceable index as well as 
of the enforceable index with its corresponding components. Notice that in the latter we have 
grouped the corresponding labor-market rigidities into two categories, “political” and 
“economic” rigidities. In the former we include the ratification of ILO Convention 87 on 
unionization, and the percentage of central government employment, while in the latter we 
include minimum wages and maternity leave. 
3. Findings 
We show results using a simple pooled approach with and without fixed effects as well as our 
preferred method, a GMM-IV system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM-IV system estimator is preferred for the following 
reasons: first, it accounts for (unobserved) country-specific effects that may bias our estimates. 
Specifically, we eliminate the control for the presence of time effects with time dummies and 
we eliminate the country-specific effects by expressing our equation in differences. Second, the 
GMM-IV system estimator controls for the possibility of endogenous regressors. We use both 
internal instruments (lagged levels as instruments for the differences, and lagged differences as 
instruments for the levels). We compute some specification tests: (a) the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, which tests the validity of the moment conditions that we set up to 
perform the IV regressions, and, (b) tests of higher-order serial correlation. In general, the 
specification tests validate our regressions for statistical inference. That is, our instruments are 
valid according to the Sargan test, and we reject the possibility of our errors displaying high-
order serial correlation.
12 
In this section we show that when the labor-market rigidity index is based on 
enforceable regulations, it does have an impact on economic performance. On the other hand, 
when the rigidity index is based on non-enforceable regulations, the end result is statistically 
meaningless to economic growth. In short, institutional enforcement does matter for growth. 
                                                           
11 We follow the tradition of empirical cross-country and panel growth regression models in focusing on the 
ultimate policy, structural, and external determinants of factor accumulation and productivity growth. Hence, we 
exclude capital and any other direct factor of production. 
12 Note that to implement this technique, we require countries for which there are at least three consecutive (five-
year-period) observations during the 1970-2000 period.    11
Table 2 presents per-capita growth regressions that link economic growth and enforceable 
labor-market rigidity using pooled data. We find a negative and statistically significant 
relationship at 5 percent between our labor rigidity index and economic performance in the 
fixed effects case. Economically speaking, we find that a one standard deviation decline in the 
index of enforceable rigidities (0.17) is associated with a growth rate that is higher by 0.28 
percentage points per year, and by 1.41 percentage points over a five-year period. In addition, 
we find that the significant coefficient for labor-market rigidities appears to be mainly driven 
by economic forces that generate such rigidities.
13 From the ordinary least squares regression 
with fixed effects, we find that a one standard deviation decline in the economic index of 
rigidities is associated with a surge in the growth rate of 0.39 percentage points per year (or 
1.95 percentage points over a five-year period).   
As in standard empirical growth specifications, we find that the initial GDP yields a 
negative and statistically significant sign in the corresponding coefficient which, as is well-
known, indicates conditional convergence among countries. Similarly, consistent with a human 
capital effect, we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient in our educational 
variable. Furthermore, we find that the macroeconomic variables included yield the expected 
signs and are consistent with previous research (Loayza et al., 2003). This is the case with the 
inflation rate (negative and statistically significant), terms of trade shocks (positive and 
statistically significant), exchange-rate overvaluation (negative and statistically significant), 
and governance (positive and statistically significant). 
Table 3 replicates the above specification, but uses our non-enforceable labor rigidity 
index instead of the enforceable one. Unsurprisingly, we find that this regressor yields a 
coefficient that, although negative, is statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
14 That is, 
rules just written “on paper” are not binding unless they are enforceable.   
In Table 4 we present the results using our preferred estimating method, namely, the 
GMM-IV based on Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As in the simple 
ordinary least squares case we find that non-enforceable labor market regulations do not have a 
                                                           
13 In other words, when we separate our index by “political” and “economic” components, we find that the 
negative and statistically significant impact is maintained in the case of the former, although not in the case of the 
political component. 
14 For the sake of economy, we do not include the full specification but focus only on our variables of interest. 
Notice that we also test a ratio between our enforceable and non-enforceable labor rigidity measure and, as 
expected, find that it is statistically significant at conventional levels.   12
bearing on economic growth for the period under consideration. In fact, while we find that most 
regressors behave in a similar fashion as in the OLS case: the non-enforceable rigidity measure 
yields a coefficient that is not statistically significant albeit with the expected sign. On the other 
hand, enforceable labor regulations are binding in terms of their impact on economic growth. 
The related coefficient is, as expected, negative and statistically significant at 5 percent.
15 
Table 5 replicates the same reduced form as before but instead of using labor rigidity 
indices, we test the actual measures that compose our enforceable rigidity measure, namely, 
minimum wage, maternity leave, unionization, and employment in central government. In the 
GMM-IV case—our preferred method—we find that consistent with our previous findings 
using “political” and “economic” factors of influence on growth, the economic variables 
(minimum wage and maternity leave) tend to yield the expected sign as well as strong 
statistical significance. This is less so in the case of the so-called political variables 
(unionization and government employment). In fact, these findings provide additional support 
for our previous results. 
3.1 Changes in Specification 
In this section we test whether the above findings are robust to the inclusion of additional 
variables. Doing this provides some confidence that the findings are not capturing the effect of 
potential omitted variables. Following Sala-i-Martín (1997), we augment the benchmark 
empirical specifications used in Table 4 by using a pool of 10 ancillary variables that are 
introduced in the regressions in a methodical manner.
16 We choose up to three at a time and 
perform regressions including all possible combinations. The variable of interest is said to be 
strongly correlated or robust with the dependent variables if the weighted cdf(0) is greater than 
or equal to 0.95. Findings for this exercise are shown in Table 6. In the first column in this table 
we report the weighted mean. The second column shows the aggregate cdf(0) under the 
assumption of non-normality. Finally, the third column presents the standard error computed as 
the weighted variance estimate for all the regressions. According to these results, our previous 
findings are robust to changes in specification when using the benchmark specification of our 
                                                           
15 When separating the economic and political effects, we find similar results to the ones presented when using 
OLS. These findings are available upon request. 
16 We use 10 ancillary variables: percentage married, percentage of immigrants, urbanization rate, rate of 
unemployment, percentage of firms whose headquarters are in the United States, percentage of multiethnic 
families, population, rate of participation, and city ethnolinguistic fractionalization (World Bank, 2005).   13
preferred method as shown in the second column in Table 4, which lends some additional 
credibility to the previous findings.  
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we compare non-enforceable and enforceable measures of labor rigidities as a 
measure of the quality of labor institutions and test whether such labor rigidities are conducive 
to long run growth. We find than non-enforceable labor regulations do not have a bearing on 
economic growth, but enforceable labor regulations do. In fact, when using a GMM-IV method 
for a panel data of countries during the period 1970-2000, which accounts for potential weak 
endogeneity, we find that such a link is negative and statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Thus, it appears that excessive labor rigidities are negatively linked with long-run 
economic growth. Our findings are robust to changes in specification. 
From a policy perspective, the above findings seem to indicate that the “thickness” of 
labor regulations per-se is not necessarily a concern since it may not affect economic 
performance. However, enforceable and binding labor regulations do have the potential to 
dramatically affect growth rates in an economy. These findings are relevant not only for 
industrial countries where excessive labor regulations appear to be quite significant and thus 
appear to be a heavy burden on overall economic performance, but also for developing 
countries where, paradoxically, part of the excessive regulation enacted in these countries may 
actually be non-binding and thus, harmless in terms of economic growth.   14
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Appendix 
Dynamic Panel Data Econometric Methodology
17 
Recently developed dynamic panel data techniques allow us to address potential endogeneity 
problems, as well as possible unobserved time and country-specific effects that may produce 
biased and inconsistent estimates.
18 This methodology formulates a set of moment conditions 
that can be estimated using GMM techniques in order to generate consistent and efficient 
estimates. Specifying the regression equation in differences allows for the elimination of the 
country-specific effect. First-differencing yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , , 1 , , 2 2 , 1 , 1 1 , , − − − − − − + − + − = − t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i X X y y y y ε ε β β .   (1) 
The use of instruments is required to deal with two issues: first, the likely endogeneity 
of the explanatory variables, X, which is reflected in the correlation between these variables and 
the error term; and, second, the correlation of the new error term, (εi,t - εi,t-1), by construction 
with the differenced, lagged dependent variable, (yi,t-1  - yi,t-2). Instead of assuming strict 
exogeneity (that is, that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term at all 
leads and lags), we allow for the possibility of simultaneity and reverse causation. We adopt the 
more flexible assumption of weak exogeneity, according to which the current explanatory 
variables may be affected by past and current realizations of the dependent variable but not by 
its future innovations. Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, ε, is not serially correlated, 
and (b) the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions 
apply: 
() [] Ey f o r s t T it s it it ,, , ; ,..., −− ⋅− = ≥ = εε 1 02 3                (2) 
() [] EX f o r s t T it s it it ,, , ; ,..., −− ⋅− = ≥ = εε 1 02 3                (3) 
The GMM estimator simply based on the moment conditions in (2) and (3) is known as 
the differences estimator. Although asymptotically consistent, this estimator has low 
asymptotic precision and large biases in small samples, which leads to the need to complement 
                                                           
17  We thank Norman Loayza, who generously contributed to this section. 
18 For instance, Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997).   17
it with the regression equation in levels.
19 For the regression in levels, the country-specific 
effect is not directly eliminated, but must be controlled for by the use of instrumental variables. 
The appropriate instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the 
corresponding variables if the following assumption holds; although there may be correlation 
between the levels of the right-hand side variables and the country-specific effect, there is no 
correlation between the differences of these variables and the country-specific effect. This 
assumption results from the following stationarity property, 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
    
                      , , , , q and p all for X E X E and y E y E i q t i i p t i i q t i i p t i η η η η ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ + + + +  (4) 
Therefore, the additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the 
regression in levels) are given by the following equations:
20 
() ( ) [] Ey y f o r s it s it s i it ,, , −− − −⋅ + == 1 01 ηε                   (5) 
() ( ) [] EX X f o r s it s it s i it ,, , −− − −⋅ + = = 1 01 ηε                   (6) 
Using the moment conditions presented in equations (2), (3), (5), and (6), and following 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), we employ a generalized method of 
moments (GMM) procedure to generate consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. The 
weighting matrix for GMM estimation can be any symmetric, positive-definite matrix, and we 
obtain the most efficient GMM estimator if we use the weighting matrix corresponding to the 
variance-covariance of the moment conditions. Since this variance-covariance is unknown, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest the following two-step 
procedure. First, assume that the residuals, εi,t, are independent and homoskedastic both across 
countries and over time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is 
used to produce first-step coefficient estimates. We construct a consistent estimate of the 
                                                           
19 Blundell and Bond (1997) show that when the lagged dependent and the explanatory variables are persistent 
over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences. This 
weakness has repercussions for both the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the differences estimator. As 
persistence increases, the asymptotic variance of the coefficients obtained with the differences estimator rises (i.e., 
deteriorating its asymptotic precision). Furthermore, Monte Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the 
instruments produces biased coefficients in small samples. This is exacerbated by the variables’ over-time 
persistence, the importance of the specific effect, and the smallness of the time-series dimension. 
20 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences specification, only the most recent difference 
is used as instrument in the levels specification. Other lagged differences would result in redundant moment 
conditions (Arellano and Bover, 1995).   18
variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions with the residuals obtained in the first 
step, and we use this matrix to re-estimate our parameters of interest (i.e., second-step 
estimates). Asymptotically, the second-step estimates are superior to the first-step ones in so far 
as efficiency is concerned. The moment conditions are applied such that each of them 
corresponds to all available periods, as opposed to each moment condition corresponding to a 
particular time period. In the former case, the number of moment conditions is independent of 
the number of time periods, whereas in the latter case, it increases more than proportionally 
with the number of time periods. Most of the literature dealing with GMM estimators applied to 
dynamic models of panel data treats the moment conditions as applying to a particular time 
period. This approach is advocated on the grounds that it allows for a more flexible variance-
covariance structure of the moment conditions. Such flexibility is achieved without placing a 
serious limitation on the degrees of freedom required for estimation of the variance-covariance 
matrix because the panels commonly used in the literature have both a large number of cross-
sectional units and a small number of time-series periods (typically not more than five). We 
have, however, chosen to work with the more restricted application of the moment conditions 
(each of them corresponding to all available time periods) because of a special characteristic of 
our panel, namely, its large time-series dimension (for some countries in our sample, we work 
with as many as 20 time-series observations). This approach allows us to work with a 
manageable number of moment conditions, so that the second-step estimates, which rely on 
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions, do not suffer from 
overfitting biases.    19
Table 1. 
Summary Statistics: Rigidity in Labor Markets 






Mean Std. Error Correlation 
with growth
p-value 
Non-Enforceable Index  0.2977 (0.201)  -0.0163 (0.704) 
Enforceable Index  0.2876 (0.174)  -0.17902  (0.000) 
(i) Economic Components  0.1474 (0.096)  -0.11081  (0.010) 
  Minimum Wage  0.1374 (0.160)  -0.12129  (0.011) 
  Maternity Leave (# days)  0.1559 (0.109)  -0.04387  (0.315) 
(ii) Political Components  0.4284 (0.351)  -0.0943  (0.051) 
  Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.5872 (0.486)  -0.13156  (0.001) 
  Central Govt. Employment  0.1637 (0.139)  0.08150  (0.085)   
Table 2. 
Panel Regressions: Labor Rigidities and Growth with Enforceable Measures 
Sample of 121 countries, five-year non-overlapping observations, 1970-2000 
 
(*) Statistically significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically 
















 Pooled  with 
Fixed  
Effects 
 Pooled   Pooled  with 
Fixed 
Effects 
 Pooled   
Constant  0.139  ** 0.156 ** 0.17472**  0.169. **
 (0.06)    (0.08)  (0.031)  (0.05) 
Initial GDP (logs)  -0.008  *  -0.05826** -0.01079**  -0.056**
 (0.01)    (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Secondary Enrollment  0.021  ** -0.01282** 0.01103**  -0.01383**
 (0.01)    (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Credit to GDP ratio  -0.008    0.00188  -0.00095  0.00185 
 (0.01)    (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Inflation Rate  -0.021  ** -0.01104** -0.0169**  -0.01142**
 (0.01)    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Openness 0.001    0.01207** -0.00528*  0.00836 
 (0.01)    (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Terms of Trade Shocks  0.066  ** 0.04683** 0.0908**  0.05052**
 (0.04)    (0.023)  (0.03)  (0.024) 
RER Overvaluation  -0.006  ** -0.00449  -0.00602*  -0.00277 
 (0.01)    (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Governance Index  0.005  ** 0.00248  0.00422**  0.00248 
 (0.00)    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Enforceable -0.032  ** -0.01568     
Labor Rigidity Index  (0.02)    (0.027)     
(i) Economic Component         -0.04056**  0.00535 
       (0.015)  (0.048) 
(ii) Political Component          -0.00477  -0.00064 
              (0.005)   (0.012)  
Observations 369    369  369  369 




Panel Regressions: Labor Rigidities and Growth with Non-Enforceable Measures 
Sample of 121 countries, five-year non-overlapping observations, 1970-2000 
 
   Coefficient Std. Error R-Squared Observations
Pooled               
Non-Enforceable -0.007    0.01 0.24  382 
Enforceable relative to Non-Enforceable  -0.004  ** 0.001 0.24  370 
Fixed Effects               
Non-Enforceable -0.007    0.03 0.54  382 
Enforceable relative to Non-Enforceable  -0.005  ** 0.002 0.55  370 
The dependent variable is the growth rate in per capita GDP. Our control variables are output per 
capita (in logs), secondary schooling, domestic credit to the private sector, trade openness, 
governance, inflation, real exchange-rate overvaluation, terms-of-trade shocks, and the labor 
regulation indicator. Only the latter is reported here. Full regression results are not reported for 
reasons of space, although they are available upon request. Asymptotic standard errors robust to 
general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity are reported. (*) Statistically significant at 10 
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Table 4. 
Panel Regressions: Labor Rigidities and Growth with Enforceable Measures 
Dependent Variable: Growth in GDP per capita, 1970-2000 
Sample of 121 countries, five-year non-overlapping observations 




  Enforceable   
Constant 
0.15271 ** 0.15936 **
 (0.017) (0.018)
Initial GDP (logs)  -0.00504 * -0.00197
 (0.003) (0.004)
Secondary Enrollment  0.01352 ** 0.00168
 (0.003) (0.004)
Credit to GDP ratio  -0.00921 ** -0.00032
 (0.002) (0.002)
Inflation Rate  -0.01797 ** -0.01382 **
 (0.002) (0.001)
Openness -0.00474 ** -0.01389 **
 (0.002) (0.003)
Terms of Trade Shocks  0.07474 ** 0.07132 **
 (0.011) (0.009)
RER Overvaluation  -0.01119 ** -0.01455 **
 (0.002) (0.002)
Governance Index  0.00690 ** 0.00219 **
 (0.001) (0.001)
Labor Rigidity Index  -0.04724 -0.07454 **
   (0.07)   (0.014) 
Sargan Test (p-value)  (0.221) (0.201)
Serial Correlation Tests (p-value) 
First Order  (0.000)  (0.000)
Second Order  (0.154)  (0.473)
Observations 219 234
R-Squared 0.1448 0.1385
(*) Statistically significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; 
(***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 5. 
Panel Growth Regressions with Individual Rigidity Measures 
Dependent Variable: Growth in GDP per capita, 1970-2000 
Sample of 121 countries, five-year non-overlapping observations 
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator 
 
 Pooled    Fixed  Effects GMM-IV   
Minimum Wage  -0.01788*  -0.02048  -0.042** 
 (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.020) 
Maternity Leave  -0.00085  0.04774  -0.032** 
 (0.014)  (0.041)  (0.015) 
Trade Union  -0.01099  0.00781  -0.014* 
 (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.008) 
Central Government Employment  0.01324  -0.03634  -0.023 
 (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.014) 
(*) Statistically significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) 
statistically significant at 1 percent. The four variables in this table are the components of 
the enforceable labor rigidity index employed in this paper: minimum wage as percentage of 
income per capita, maternity leave with full pay measured in number of days, trade union 
measured by ratification of ILO Convention 87, and central government employment as a 
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Table 6. 
Sensitivity to Changes in Specification 
Sensitivity Analysis for Benchmark Specification 
 
 Mean  cdf(0)  Standard Error 
Enforceable Labor Rigidity Measure  -0.0079  0.96  0.011 
      
(i) Minimum Wage  -0.0433  0.93  0.019 
(ii) Maternity Leave  -0.0351  0.93  0.016 
(iii) Trade Union  -0.0145  0.90  0.007 
(iv) Central Government Employment  -0.0296  0.88  0.014 
 
The second column presents the standard error of the variable of interest, while the first 
column shows the cumulative distribution function (0). A variable whose weighted cdf(0) is 
larger than 0.95 is significantly correlated with the dependent variable (i.e. robust) at a 5 
percent significance level. The cdf is computed assuming non-normality of the parameters 
estimated. Results are similar if we assume normality, instead. The benchmark regression 
employed is that of the second column in Table 4. Estimation Method: GMM-IV System 
 
 
 